📚The TL;DR📝

1. Ukraine: Population: 35,661,826. Largest ethnic groups: Ukrainians (77.8%), Russians (17.3%), Belarusians (0.6%). Borders Russia to the east, Poland to the west, Romania to the southwest, and Belarus to the north.

2. After achieving independence in 1991, Ukraine suffered from a protracted political dispute between pro-European and pro-Russian factions. Ukraine tried to maintain neutrality between the two blocs.

3. In 2014, these efforts collapsed. Russia occupied Crimea, and pro-Russian separatists began a civil war. The civil war ended in a ceasefire negotiated by France and Germany.

4. In 2022, the ceasefire broke, and Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, several countries have tried and failed to facilitate new peace negotiations.

5. If the Trump administration’s efforts succeed, energy prices would fall, the United States would gain access to critical minerals and win a significant new bilateral trading partner.

📌Can Trump Negotiate Peace in Ukraine? 📌

A Rainy Day in Anchorage

On August 15th,  Russia scored its most significant public relations coup since its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. For the first time since the beginning of the conflict, Vladimir Putin sat down with Donald Trump. He secured a commitment from the United States to facilitate negotiations for ending the war, as well as an eventual resumption of regular diplomatic and trade ties. 

Trump has viewed these negotiations as a victory. He campaigned on ending the war in Ukraine “in 24 hours” after taking office, but has yet to deliver on this promise. Initial negotiations with both countries stalled, as Ukraine was hesitant to agree to an American proposal to supervise a ceasefire in exchange for control over Ukraine’s mineral resources. At the same time, the Russian government appeared unimpressed by the Trump administration’s entreaties. By August, the situation had changed. A Russian offensive stalled, and the Trump administration had shifted from an antagonistic relationship with the Ukrainian government to a friendly rapport. Both sides appeared willing to negotiate, and, critically, to allow the United States to mediate.

Although the negotiations may seem like a turning point in the conflict, the Trump administration’s efforts are the latest stage in a thirty-year diplomatic effort to cool Russo-Ukrainian tensions and arrest their simmering conflict, an effort that has failed in the face of intractable disputes over language, nationality, and territory. If Trump turns the page on this history and manages to bring both parties to a comprehensive agreement, then the United States would stand to reap the benefits of lower energy and commodity prices and gain a new bilateral trade partner.

Nuclear Insurance or Security Assurances?

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic passed a declaration of independence in August 1991 in the aftermath of a failed hardline coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, effectively severing the state from the Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviet immediately renamed the country to Ukraine, lifted Soviet laws against dissidents and independent political groups, and began to tear down and rename Soviet-era monuments and streets. Following the declaration, the teetering Soviet Union continued to represent Ukraine abroad. A referendum formalizing independence won with overwhelming public support in December 1991, including in the heavily Russian-speaking Donbass and Crimea. 

The breakup of the Soviet Union and Ukraine’s newfound independence created a serious challenge for the international community. As the second-largest Soviet republic, Ukraine was home to hundreds of nuclear weapons, which the United States and European countries feared could be stolen by or sold to terrorists or rogue states. Under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia was the legal successor to the Soviet Union and therefore entitled to the whole of its nuclear arsenal. Ukraine, however, was reluctant to surrender its atomic arsenal, fearing a potential Russian invasion.

After a year-long series of negotiations, Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum, agreeing to hand over its nuclear weapons to Russia in exchange for subsidies to its nuclear power program and a non-binding commitment from the United States, Britain, and Russia to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine,” and seek UN Security Council assistance in case of a conflict. 

With the Budapest Memorandum signed, America and Britain backed substantial economic aid to Ukraine’s struggling economy. The political situation settled into a pro-Western and Ukrainian nationalist bloc competing against a pro-Russian and regionalist bloc, with the two sides constantly bickering over allegations of election fraud and corruption.

War and Peace in the Donbass

In 2014, these tensions came to a head during the Euromaidan protests. Pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych suspended an association agreement with the European Union, sparking a protest movement that occupied Maidan Square in central Kyiv. After a rogue unit of riot police killed 80 protestors in the square, Yanukovych’s authority collapsed, and he fled to Russia in February 2014. Five days after Yankuyovych fled, unmarked Russian troops began crossing into Crimea, beginning the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Shortly after the seizure of Crimea, pro-Russian militants and Russian agitators began operating in the Donbass, a majority-Russian-speaking part of Ukraine with significant mineral deposits, seizing towns and declaring the independence of two pro-Russian states, the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic. (LDPR) Russia directly intervened while officially disclaiming involvement.

In the wake of Russian intervention, Ukraine was eager to secure a ceasefire. The German and French governments offered to mediate, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) agreed to facilitate enforcement. Following negotiations, Ukraine, Russia, the Russian proxies and the OSCE signed the Minsk Protocol. The protocol provided for an immediate ceasefire, criminal immunity for separatists, and eventual decentralization of Ukraine and local elections in the Donbass. Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE also agreed to create the Trilateral Conflict Group to act as a forum in negotiating the maintenance of the ceasefire and the specifics of an eventual peace plan.

Within hours of the signing of the first Minsk Protocol, both Russian and Ukrainian forces broke the ceasefire. Within weeks, it had completely collapsed. Russia and LDPR forces captured the Donetsk Airport and trapped Ukrainian troops in the small railway hub of Debaltseve. The Ukrainian army appeared on the verge of collapse, and European countries began to fear that Russia could completely overrun Ukraine.

Faced with this escalating crisis, the parties met again in Minsk for another round of tense negotiations. Russia and its proxies initially stonewalled the talks, sending unqualified representatives in an attempt to stall while Russian troops pressed the pocket in Debaltseve. After a marathon 16-hour negotiating round, Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany signed a second ceasefire agreement. It allowed pro-Russian forces to take over Debaltseve and maintain their current positions, while keeping the political goals of the initial protocol.

Despite Russia’s superior position and the similarity of the two agreements, the ceasefire held with only occasional, minor violations until December 2021, when Russia began amassing troops and equipment on its border with Ukraine. A flurry of abortive peace negotiations followed. The Russian government remained coy on its intentions, signing a joint declaration of the Trilateral Group which affirmed the Minsk Protocols while simultaneously continuing its military build-up and escalating hawkish rhetoric. 

On the eve of the invasion, there was an alleged breakthrough. Dmitry Kozak, a longtime pro-Putin fixer and bureaucrat nicknamed the “Cheshire Cat” for his droll humor and wide, menacing smile, persuaded the Ukrainians to accept a treaty that would prohibit the country from joining NATO. Putin quickly overruled Kozak and pressed forward with his invasion plan. He claimed the Ukrainian government was extirpating Russian culture from its society and planning to join NATO to crush the Donbass separatists and eventually retake Crimea. For Putin, this was a clash of civilizations, not a set of issues to be resolved by diplomats.

Talking Past Each Other

Despite the intensity of the war, negotiations between the two countries began almost as soon as the war started and have continued since. The earliest negotiations were a bureaucratic farce. Russia committed to paying Ukraine pipeline transit fees for Russian oil and natural gas to flow, in exchange for Ukraine not shutting off the pipelines. This arrangement continued until 2025, when Ukraine elected not to renew its contract. The two sides also agreed to conduct prisoner swaps after negotiations facilitated by Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

As the war dragged on, the Russian and Ukrainian negotiating positions solidified. The Russian government demanded all the territory that it annexed in 2022, including areas recaptured by Ukraine after annexation. It also demanded Ukrainian disarmament, an amendment to the Ukrainian constitution which would make the country permanently neutral and unable to join military alliances, and official, co-equal status for the Russian language in Ukraine. Ukraine sought a return to its pre-2014 borders, a complete withdrawal of Russian troops, and security guarantees from Western powers.

Because of these issues, internationally mediated negotiations have enjoyed only limited success. The earliest peace talks began in March 2022, facilitated by Turkey in Istanbul. Although both countries nearly reached an agreement, the talks gradually fizzled as Ukraine became more confident in its odds on the battlefield. Despite the setback, simultaneous discussions facilitated by the UN led to a guarantee from Russia that it would not target Ukrainian grain shipping or port facilities used to export grain.

Besides Turkey, several other neutral parties have offered to facilitate negotiations. Mexico attempted to enlist the Vatican and India to host discussions between the two countries in an effort to reach a comprehensive settlement. China released a vague 12-point plan in February 2023, which both Russia and Ukraine greeted with tepid approval. With the failure of these efforts, peace negotiations reached a standstill.

🌎Why It Matters🌎

Despite the optimism in Anchorage, Trump’s peace plan has remained vague. The United States and Russia did not release a joint statement in the wake of the meeting, and the United States has not addressed the substantive territorial and linguistic issues that dogged past negotiation efforts. Like the negotiations in Istanbul, the United States could end up hosting productive, positive talks that flounder on the specifics.

Nevertheless, an end to the conflict could be a significant economic boon for the United States and Europe. Sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union drove global oil and natural gas prices up significantly, only mitigated by the inability of the U.S. and EU to stop other countries, chiefly India and China, from importing Russian oil. One analysis from the Department of the Treasury found that oil prices would have spiked by 100% without any Russian oil on the market, and European natural gas prices have doubled since the invasion began.

Moreover, the United States would regain access to both the Russian and Ukrainian supply of critical minerals, necessary for a wide variety of high-tech manufactured goods, including automobiles, airplanes, and semiconductors. China, which has effectively cornered the market on rare earth minerals, suspended the export of five such minerals in 2023, after the United States barred China from purchasing certain advanced semiconductors. The ban skyrocketed mineral prices, although manufacturers and consumers are only beginning to see the effects. Both Russia and Ukraine possess significant untapped reserves of critical minerals, which the United States could take advantage of to flout China’s export ban.

Regardless of these ambitions, the United States has a thirty-year history of failed negotiations and agreements to overcome.